This paper systematically reviews recent advances in evolutionary game dynamics with environmental feedback, a theoretical framework characterizing the continuous coevolution of individual strategies and environmental states. First, under the mean-field approximation, we detail models that couple replicator dynamics with environmental variables, especially frameworks in which payoff structures are coupled to environmental states. We summarize the research on rigorous conditions for the “oscillatory tragedy of the commons” (o-TOC) and explain how physical and ecological factors—such as finite carrying capacity, mutation, fluctuation, and time delays—can induce bifurcations (e.g., Hopf bifurcations), multistability, and oscillations, thereby reshaping the phase portrait and the conditions under which “tragedy of the commons” (TOC) outcomes emerge or can be averted. Furthermore, we outline how integrating explicit common-resource governance mechanisms, such as state-dependent inspection and punishment, compensation, and other incentive mechanisms, can steer the nonlinear system away from resource depletion. Second, we introduce the effects of spatial structures and network topologies. The transition from wellmixed populations to localized interactions and resource diffusion can break global synchronization, leading to the formation of self-organized spatiotemporal patterns and strategy-resource clusters. We highlight two coupled mechanisms: cooperator clustering can enhance local payoffs and environmental recovery, while localized feedback reshapes cluster-boundary stability, thereby reshaping invasion and coexistence dynamics and transition pathways. Third, we discuss game state transitions as a discrete environmental feedback framework, where collective actions trigger payoff changes, highlighting how asymmetric returns across discrete states facilitate cooperation. Finally, we bridge frontier empirical findings with theoretical studies, explicitly discussing microbial public-goods experiments (where public goods reshape competitor metabolism) and real-world resource governance. We conclude by outlining future research directions, particularly the necessity of incorporating multiscale heterogeneous resources, complex mechanisms of real-world social and ecological systems, collective decision-making mechanisms, finite-population stochasticity, and the direct coupling of environmental feedback to demographic processes such as survival and reproduction. Overall, this review clarifies the major frontiers and developmental trajectory of evolutionary games with environmental feedback, and offers a reference for understanding the emergence of cooperation and the regulation of TOC phenomena.