In nature and human society, individuals' spatial movement decisions and game interaction ranges are often governed by distinct mechanisms. However, most previous studies on evolutionary game dynamics with migration have defaulted to treating the game interaction radius and migration perceptual radius as identical, which ignores the prevalent range asymmetry between strategic interaction and spatial movement in real systems. In this paper, we decouple these two radii by treating the migration perceptual radius r_\rm m and game interaction radius r_\rm i as two fully independent parameters, construct a spatial prisoner's dilemma model with continuous migration in two-dimensional continuous space, and investigate how variations in these two factors affect the evolution of cooperation through numerical simulations and microscopic mechanism analysis. We find that the migration perceptual radius exerts a pronounced non-monotonic regulatory effect on the cooperation level. When r_\rm m is excessively small, individuals lack directional guidance for migration, making it difficult for cooperators to aggregate effectively, and the cooperation level remains close to that of random mixing. When r_\rm m lies within a specific intermediate range, defectors can efficiently track and infiltrate local cooperator clusters, leading to a pronounced valley in the cooperation level that is robust across a wide range of parameter combinations including different values of the temptation to defect and game interaction radii. In contrast, when r_\rm m increases to a moderate level, cooperators achieve directed aggregation and form stable structural protection against defector invasion, resulting in a substantial enhancement of cooperation. A further increase in r_\rm m enables defectors to follow cooperators' movement signals at large scale, breaking cooperative clusters and causing the cooperation level to decline again. Through snapshots of spatial distributions and polar rose diagrams of migration directions, we reveal the microscopic mechanisms underlying each regime. Furthermore, the game interaction radius r_\rm i plays a key regulatory role in cooperation evolution. An intermediate r_\rm i most effectively supports the formation and maintenance of cooperative clusters, while an excessively large r_\rm i weakens network reciprocity and suppresses cooperation. In the parameter space spanned by r_\rm i and r_\rm m, the cooperation level exhibits a clearly non-uniform distribution with sharp boundaries between high-cooperation and low-cooperation regions, confirming the significant joint regulatory roles of both radii. In addition, the migration step size and population density interact with r_\rm m to jointly determine cooperation outcomes. The promoting effect of an optimal r_\rm m is particularly prominent at low population density, whereas high density generally suppresses the cooperation level. These results provide a novel theoretical perspective for understanding the intrinsic mechanisms by which individual movement behaviors facilitate the emergence of cooperation in real-world complex systems.