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中国物理学会期刊

模拟核弹头核查中能谱遮盖技术的概念研究

CSTR: 32037.14.aps.50.1405

CONCEPTUAL STUDY OF SPECTRAL BLANKOUT TECHNIQUE ON INSPECTING OF SOME SURROGATED NUCLEAR WARHEADS

CSTR: 32037.14.aps.50.1405
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  • 建立了一套基于局域网的核弹头核查系统.系统的硬件组成为:一台网络服务器、两台个人计算机和一台便携式高纯锗γ谱仪.系统的软件(能谱遮盖软件)包括核查方软件、被核查方软件两个模块,它们都采用交互式人机对话,通过局域网进行通讯.核查中,探测器所采集的高分辨γ射线能谱需要经过被核查方软件的防泄密处理后,才能以遮盖能谱或文字显示方式发送给核查方终端.能谱遮盖的原则是,对核查方要求核查的能段,核查方软件必须提供真实、客观的显示;而对其他能段,可根据被核查方对“敏感信息”的认识,作适当的遮盖处理.文字显示方式则是直截了当地回答核查对象是“铀弹”、“钚弹”或“非核弹”.利用能谱遮盖软件对模拟核弹头进行了类型识别和能谱遮盖实验.实验结果表明,所建立的基于局域网的核弹头核查系统具有识别模拟核弹头类型和在核查中保护敏感信息泄漏的功能,特别值得指出的是,核查结果文字显示方式具有较好的防泄密功能,有助于提高核查可信度.实验同时也暴露了该系统的一些不足点,如系统组件过多,集成度不够;被核查方软件的人机交互对话和核查结果的能谱遮盖显示方式可能降低核查的可信度等等

     

    We built up a nuclear warhead verification system based on an Intranet platform. The hardware of the system consists of an Intranet server, two personnel computers and a portable high purity gerinanium gamma-ray spectrometer. The software, Blanking-out, is made of two modules designed for the inspecting and inspected parties respectively. Both modules are interactive and communicate through the Intranet. When the system operates, any sensitive information carried by the high resolution gamma-ray spectrum collected by the detector will be meddled by the inspected module before the package of spectral data is sent to the inspecting module to prevent a disclosure of sensitive information. After receiving the spectral data, the inspecting module will display on the screen of the inspecting PC terminal the verification results in a form of blankouted spectrum (spectral blanking-out form) or a form of a piece of phrase (phrase form). The guideline to the spectral blanking-out is that: for those ranges of energy obligated to be inspected, the inspected module should ensure that the inspecting module can display truly their objective spectrum; and for the other ranges of energy, the inspected module can blankout certain parts of the spectra based on the knowledge of sensitive information. Phrase form is rather straightforward, answering the question whether the inspected warhead is a “uranium-type”, “plutonium-type” or “non-nuclear type.” We conducted a demonstration on some surrogates for nuclear warheads to see whether the nuclear warhead verification system possesses the capability of identifying the type of a warhead and blanking-out sensitive spectral information. The demonstration was carried out successfully. Phrase form is especially recommendable due to its stronger capability to prevent sensitive information from disclosure and its higher verification credibility. The demonstration also disclosed some deficiencies of the system, such as too much disintegrated hardware components lower the integration of the system, the interactive operation of the inspected module and the spectral blanking-out form decrease the verification credibility and so on.

     

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