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Evolutionary gambling dynamics for two growing complex networks

Xiang Hai-Tao Liang Shi-Dong

Evolutionary gambling dynamics for two growing complex networks

Xiang Hai-Tao, Liang Shi-Dong
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Publishing process
  • Received Date:  23 June 2014
  • Accepted Date:  27 August 2014
  • Published Online:  05 January 2015

Evolutionary gambling dynamics for two growing complex networks

  • 1. School of Physics and Engineering, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou 510275, China;
  • 2. State Key Laboratory of Optoelectronic Materials and Technologies, Guangzhou 510275, China;
  • 3. Provincial Key Laboratory of display Materials and Technologies, Guangzhou 510275, China
Fund Project:  Project supported by the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities, and the State Key Laboratory of Optoelectronic Materials and Technologies Funds, and the Provincial Key Laboratory of display Materials and Technologies Funds.

Abstract: The dynamic complex network is an important model of social structure and stability. Based on the single dynamic complex network, we propose a growing double-network evolutionary gambling model. When the two networks are separated, we find that the average of cooperation strategy has a jump as the payoff increases, which can be regarded as a phase transition. This result is a generalized result of static gambling network. When the two networks are connected, their averages of cooperation strategy are synchronized. When the intra-linkages are increased, the natural selection does not favor cooperation, while the fair selection does. When the inter-linkages are increased, the average of cooperation strategy decreases for both networks. As the ratio of inter- and intra- linkage is constant, the more the average degree, the less the cooperation. We find the existence of defection leader, and uncover its influence on the average of cooperation strategy and how it interacts with cooperation leader. These results provide some hints to understand the social structure, stability and evolution.

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